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ABSTRACT
Tragic choices arise during the COVID-19 pandemic 
when the limited resources made available in acute 
medical settings cannot be accessed by all patients 
who need them. In these circumstances, healthcare 
rationing is unavoidable. It is important in any healthcare 
rationing process that the interests of the community 
are recognised, and that decision- making upholds 
these interests through a fair and consistent process 
of decision- making. Responding to recent calls (1) to 
safeguard individuals’ legal rights in decision- making 
in intensive care, and (2) for new authoritative national 
guidance for decision- making, this paper seeks to clarify 
what consistency and fairness demand in healthcare 
rationing during the COVID-19 pandemic, from both a 
legal and ethical standpoint. The paper begins with a 
brief review of UK law concerning healthcare resource 
allocation, considering how community interests and 
individual rights have been marshalled in judicial 
deliberation about the use of limited health resources 
within the National Health Service (NHS). It is then 
argued that an important distinction needs to be drawn 
between procedural and outcome consistency, and that a 
procedurally consistent decision- making process ought to 
be favoured. Congruent with the position that UK courts 
have adopted for resource allocation decision- making 
in the NHS more generally, specific requirements for a 
procedural framework and substantive triage criteria to 
be applied within that framework during the COVID-19 
pandemic are considered in detail.
What happens if demand for intensive care exceeds 
the treatment facilities available? How should 
doctors decide between us? The COVID-19 
pandemic has made these questions pressing, and 
across the world much attention has been paid to the 
actual decisions that doctors are expected to make. 
As of May 2020, professional bodies have invested 
much effort in generating guidance of various forms 
on how these decisions should be made—in almost 
all cases the guidance seems to permit unpalatable 
decisions about who gets treatment.1 2 As we write, 
the UK is coping with the additional demands 
placed on it without extensive rationing of venti-
lators or intensive care beds. However, the experi-
ence clearly highlights the need for more systematic 
responses associated with the need to prioritise and 
deprioritise a wide range of interventions during 
the pandemic.
COVID-19 has provoked two main responses 
from ethicists and lawyers concerned with medical 
decision- making. For some, emerging and broad 
ethical guidance produced by professional bodies 
does not go far enough. What is needed, so the 
claim goes, is overarching, national guidance from 
government that commands authority and ensures 
consistent, fair decision- making.3 4 For others, the 
response to the guidance produced has been the 
assertion of individual rights against rationing, 
warning that any compromise of normal treat-
ment is vulnerable to legal challenge, and should 
be undertaken with caution for fear of overlooking 
patients’ rights.5
We take issue with both these views. Rationing 
decisions should certainly not be ad hoc, but an indi-
vidual’s ‘right to treatment’ has meaning only in the 
context of the community in which rights are valued. 
Indeed, an overly ‘individualistic’ approach to rights 
damages health. Healthcare rights may be imprecise 
and come into conflict, but they never contradict 
community interests. This is because rights always 
belong within the scope of things that are of value 
for the community that recognises them. In this sense, 
because the protection of individual rights matters for 
the community, it is in the interests of the commu-
nity to safeguard them in a way that is consistent 
with other things that are of value.6 7 This pandemic 
provides an opportunity to rebalance the debate 
about healthcare rationing generally, as well as how 
notions of authority and fairness in decision- making 
concerning the use of resources in the National 
Health Service (NHS) ought to be configured.8
Our starting point, therefore, is ‘community’, 
properly understood. We reject the notion that indi-
vidual rights have some special status independent 
of the community in which they are recognised.9–11 
We argue that in law and ethics the fundamental 
objective of any decision to ration health resources 
is to serve the best interests of the community as a 
whole by responding to patients fairly, equally and 
consistently. In order to do this, group interests need 
to be balanced against the interests of specific indi-
viduals. Rights are not overlooked by balancing the 
needs of those already in intensive care with those 
awaiting admission because of capacity constraints, 
but it is crucial to be clear about how this process of 
balancing is achieved.
We progress as follows: in (A) Balancing Individual 
and Public Interests section, we outline a series of 
legal principles on the balance between individual 
and community interests, in the context of judicial 
review, human rights and healthcare rationing in 
the UK. In (B) Procedural versus Outcome Consis-
tency section, we distinguish between procedural 
and outcome consistency. In (C) Procedural Frame-
work section, we describe the procedural frame-
work necessary to promote fairness and consistency, 
and in (D) Substantive Triage Criteria section, we 
consider a range of substantive triage criteria that 
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BALANCING INDIVIDUAL AND PUBLIC INTERESTS
In considering how interests in healthcare can be conceived at 
the time of a pandemic in the UK, it is important to bear in mind 
the following four legal principles:
(1) Claims to treatment from single claimants must always be 
balanced against ‘the rights of others’.
Healthcare policy may benefit some and harm others. But even 
here, in a series of cases, the European Court of Human Rights 
has refused to guarantee treatment to those adversely affected. 
For example, in Pentiacova v Moldova,12 patients suffering 
from chronic renal failure complained that their haemodialysis 
services were being rationed, to the detriment of their health. 
The European Court of Human Rights rejected their claim. It 
said:
The applicants’ claim amounts to a call on public funds which, 
in view of the scarce resources, would have to be diverted from 
other worthy needs funded by the taxpayer… While it is clearly 
desirable that everyone should have access to a full range of 
medical treatment, including life- saving medical procedures and 
drugs, the lack of resources means that there are, unfortunately, in 
the Contracting States many individuals who do not enjoy them, 
especially in cases of permanent and expensive treatment… [I]
t cannot be said that the respondent State failed to strike a fair 
balance between the competing interests of the applicants and the 
community as a whole.
For example, resource allocators should consider the rela-
tive need for treatment, the likely benefit, equality of access, 
evidence of efficacy and cost. In respect of COVID-19 treat-
ment, relevant too may be the disproportionate impact on black, 
Asian and minority ethnic communities. As the science develops, 
so the response should be reasonable and proportionate. Deci-
sions of this gravity cannot be left to individual doctors alone; 
a framework of procedural guidance is required. This might be 
created by clinicians, hospital managers and patient representa-
tives to optimise available resources, perhaps administered by 
triage coordinators and (ideally) an appeal mechanism.
(2) Judicial review of resource allocation acknowledges that 
hard choices are inevitable.
As the Court of Appeal said in R v Cambridge DHA,13 ‘Diffi-
cult and agonizing judgments have to be made as to how a 
limited budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage 
of the maximum number of patients. That is not a judgment 
the court can make.’ The court has neither the authority nor 
expertise to do so, even though judicial review subjects their 
rationality to close scrutiny. It demands that public authorities 
consider all the relevant factors, including the resources avail-
able. This explains why a procedural framework is so crucial to 
this process (see ref 14). But it does not undermine the central 
principle that rationing is lawful—provided it responds to every-
one’s need fairly and consistently. This creates procedural rights 
to a fair system of decision- making, but not substantive rights of 
access to particular treatment.
COVID-19 has not (yet) required doctors to ration intensive 
care. If limited resources were to cause conflict, patients in inten-
sive care could not claim greater rights to treatment than urgent 
patients awaiting admission. In such a case, treatment could not 
simply be withdrawn. However, as the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) says, doctors could lawfully 
prioritise care (say) by moving a patient from an intensive ward 
to a high- dependency, or step- down unit, or transfer the patient 
to intensive care elsewhere.15 That said, decisions which involve 
life and death, or that damage health, will be subject to careful 
scrutiny to ensure relevant factors have been weighed and 
balanced properly.
(3) Precisely this approach has been confirmed in a case 
involving COVID-19.
On 9 April 2020, in University College London Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust v MB,16 the High Court considered a deci-
sion of a Foundation Trust to withdraw residential care from a 
mental health patient so as to make space to accommodate other 
patients with COVID-19. The court upheld the decision. It said, 
at para 55:
In some circumstances, a hospital may have to decide which of 
two patients, A or B, has a better claim to a bed, or a better claim 
to a bed in a particular unit, even ceasing to provide in- patient 
care to one of them… will certainly cause extreme distress or will 
give rise to significant risks to that patient’s health or even life. 
A hospital which in those circumstances determines rationally, 
and in accordance with a lawful policy, that A’s clinical need is 
greater than B’s, or that A would derive greater clinical benefit 
from the bed than B, is not precluded by Article 3 ECHR from 
declining to offer inpatient care to B. This is because in- patient 
care is a scarce resource and, as Auld LJ put it in R v North West 
Lancashire Health Authority ex p. A [2000] 1 WLR 977, at 996, 
‘[i]t is plain… that article 3 was not designed for circumstances… 
where the challenge is as to a health authority’s allocation of finite 
funds between competing demands.’ Decisions taken by a health 
authority on the basis of finite funds are, in my judgment, no 
different in principle from those taken by a hospital on the basis 
of finite resources of other kinds. In each case a choice has to be 
made and, in making it, it is necessary to consider the needs of 
more than one person.
As the Court of Appeal has confirmed, our right of patient 
choice arises only within the range of treatments that are reason-
ably available to us although, as we note above, if such a deci-
sion to benefit one patient were to expose another patient to 
significant risk, the decision could be subject to close scrutiny in 
judicial review.17
(4) The statutory duty to allocate resources belongs to the rele-
vant public authority, not judges. Public authorities have wide 
discretion in making resource allocation decisions.
As the Supreme Court has said, the European Convention 
on Human Rights confers broad discretion on public author-
ities allocating resources ‘between the competing interests of 
the individual and of the community as a whole’.18 The court’s 
powers are no greater than those available to applicants in judi-
cial review. In N v ACCG,19 the applicant family sought the 
resources necessary to be trained as carers providing round- the- 
clock care for their disabled son at home. It might have been in 
his best interests (or not), but the clinical commissioning group 
(CCG) could not afford to adopt such a policy for everyone and 
refused the request. The parents’ application was refused. Such a 
decision involves issues of affordability and the interests of other 
patients unknown to the court. For this reason, this was not a 
decision for judges. Resource allocation is for the CCG. At paras 
35–44, the Supreme Court said:
So how is the court’s duty to decide what is in the best interests 
of [the patient] to be reconciled with the fact that the court only 
has power to take a decision that [the patient] himself could have 
taken? It has no greater power to oblige others to do what is best 
than [the patient] would have himself [ie, in JR]. This must mean 
that…the court can only choose between the available options… 
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These principles bear on the crisis produced by COVID-19 
in the UK. In this national context, individual rights can be 
understood only within the constraints on public resources. In 
extreme cases, resources may be withdrawn from one patient 
to divert treatment to others. This decision rests with the public 
authority, not the court. The attraction of consistency should not 
encourage triage criteria to undervalue (say) elderly patients as 
a group, or patients with disabilities. Our individual needs and 
circumstances must be balanced with those of others without 
prejudgement by ‘group- stereotyping’. Nevertheless, provided 
the process balances the relevant circumstances fairly and 
proportionately and with proper regard for equality and human 
rights, the decision will be upheld.20
The challenge, therefore, is to understand how to guarantee 
that these difficult and unenviable decisions respond fairly, 
equally and consistently to patients. This is the purpose of the 
procedural framework which we outline below.
PROCEDURAL VERSUS OUTCOME CONSISTENCY
How should doctors decide between us? Inevitably, intensive 
care doctors may differ—even about the same patient. Some may 
insist on their Hippocratic duty to promote the best interests 
of their individual patients. Others may promote the greatest 
benefit for the greatest number and create space to help those 
most likely to recover quickly. Yet others may favour the first in 
the queue, or some over others (eg, clinicians, care workers or 
delivery drivers), or disfavour patients over a certain age. Still 
others may adopt a provisional Hippocratic approach unless 
and until they are given clear instructions to the contrary by 
their hospital employer. Importantly each of these variations 
represents distinctive but nevertheless reasonable interpretations 
of what it means to be a clinician and perform the professional 
role of the doctor. These different views may represent what 
individual clinicians take to lie at the very heart of what it is to 
be a doctor.
Such variation, even if it is reasonable and the product of 
genuine and deep commitment, is unsettling: it clearly leads 
to inconsistent responses to the rationing context presented 
by COVID-19 which look unfair and unattractive. As has been 
claimed, decision- making about life and death surely requires 
consistency.3 4 The value of consistency in decision- making is not 
just important for patients; doctors too will want reassurance 
that they are acting ethically and legally, otherwise an absence 
of proper guidance exposes clinicians to complaint afterwards. 
However, those calling for national guidance in order to provide 
such consistency need to address an important question: what 
does consistency demand of doctors and others in this context?
In our view, national guidance would encourage consistent 
decision- making. But, as desirable as national guidance would 
be, it is not strictly necessary. It is true that the government may 
have an obligation under the European Convention of Human 
Rights to establish a national framework of guidance if a public 
authority exposes people to systematic danger which cannot be 
managed locally. Until that time, however, we note that priority 
setting decisions within CCGs have never had the benefit of over-
arching national guidance because the government has taken the 
view that local decision- makers are best able to respond to local 
needs. Instead, judicial review has clarified how local decision- 
makers should introduce fair and consistent procedures to be 
legally defensible. What is essential is for a framework to spell 
out which values are to be considered in funding decisions and 
how they are to be considered in ways that are fair, rational and 
consistent.21–25
It is helpful, in this context, to distinguish procedural and 
outcome consistency.26 Understandably, both patients and clini-
cians find appeal in the idea of outcome consistency: guidance 
that operated in this way would enable people to know where 
they stand, in advance of the decision being made. An algo-
rithmic or formula- based decision- making process that sought 
to crunch the relevant values and facts would likely lie at the 
heart of guidance of this kind. One reason that people find this 
appealing might lie in the fact that providing a kind of metric 
or formula makes hugely difficult problems seem more manage-
able. But of course, such an approach disguises the difficulty and 
hides it behind the algorithm so that we may be encouraged to 
expect outcome consistency in circumstances where it is impos-
sible to achieve.
In contrast, national guidance that embraced procedural 
consistency would require us to accept that these difficult 
decisions depend irreducibly on the details of the case and 
the context of the decision. This is not to accept that anything 
goes, however. We need assurance that the relevant facts and 
values have been given reasonable consideration in a more open- 
ended process of decision- making. Crucially, procedural consis-
tency means that the set of things considered, and the way they 
have been considered, is the same (or very similar) across cases 
without prejudging the individual elements of the case. Proce-
dural consistency means accepting that a consistent process can 
give rise to different and so seemingly inconsistent outcomes: 
we might reasonably differ about whether a person should be 
allocated an intensive care bed or a ventilator when we have 
balanced all the relevant factors in this judgement. Inevitably, 
therefore, although the procedures between different decision- 
makers may be analogous, the outcomes between them may 
legitimately differ, according to local and individual need, and 
the availability of resources.
PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK
In our view, healthcare resource allocation should promote 
procedural consistency, rather than outcome consistency. This 
is not to say that outcome consistency is irrelevant. Instead, it 
is that the latter is unachievable in decisions of this kind for the 
reasons that we discussed above. A procedural framework should 
consider how decisions governing resources allocation are made, 
sensitive to the legal requirements discussed above in 'Balancing 
Individual and Public Interests'. Importantly, such a framework 
sits above, and functions to structure, local context- specific deci-
sions ensuring that the interests of individual patients as well as 
the community are accorded proper respect. A framework of 
reasonable procedures is an essential means of expressing the 
community’s interest in responding to everyone’s needs fairly 
and consistently.
There are two main reasons for adopting this approach that 
apply equally to triaging decisions during a pandemic, as well 
as to other prioritisation decisions that need to be made. First, 
the ethical values that underpin fairness in decision- making are 
reasonably contested; there is no single ethical position about 
the nature and extent of resources people are entitled to receive. 
We can reasonably disagree whether to maximise utility or 
equity (or clinical freedom). We can reasonably disagree about 
whether health professionals should be prioritised, or those who 
have lived with social and economic disadvantage. Second, the 
resources context within which the decision is made is morally 
significant. Precisely how we interpret these considerations, or 
accord them weight, will depend on the circumstances of each 
healthcare setting and each individual patient.
 o
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How, then, should procedural consistency be realised in any 
local process of triage decision- making endorsed within national 
guidance? As others have argued,27 28 and consistent with the 
legal and ethical requirements of procedural consistency in 
resource allocation decision- making generally, we encourage 
hospitals to appoint a team of senior doctors, perhaps with an 
independent member, a ‘triage team’, to oversee and support 
clinical decision- making and, if needs be, make final decisions 
about individual patients. This will promote procedural consis-
tency in the decision- making process. Further, as hospitals seek 
to coordinate their activities with one another at regional level, 
this internal hospital system should be reviewed regionally, to 
ensure that the requirements of consistency are met. Admittedly, 
this process diverts senior doctors from treating patients. It will 
be time consuming and emotionally draining. There is a difficult 
balance between providing reasonable procedural overview and 
letting doctors do their job. However, when searching legal and 
ethical questions are asked in future, the risk of inconsistency 
from not having such a system is obvious for both patients and 
doctors.
In addition to notions of fairness and consistency, an important 
part of this procedural framework concerns the duty of transpar-
ency and candour to patients. As is now well established, the 
principles of informed consent require clinicians to explain to 
patients and relatives both the uncertainties about their care and 
the processes in place for making decisions, including in extreme 
circumstances, the difficult decision to withdraw or withhold 
treatment.29–31
SUBSTANTIVE TRIAGE CRITERIA
As we have seen, procedural consistency does not abro-
gate responsibility to determine the substantive criteria for 
decision- making about patients within the agreed framework. 
Understandably, a consistent decision- making process requires 
content—those ethical values which shape and inform all reason-
able decisions. What substantive triage criteria should be used to 
distinguish between patients and how should they be incorpo-
rated into a procedural framework for fair decision- making?
Clearly, this is where much of the debate has taken place. On 
our account, it is also the place where all relevant concerns are 
heard and balanced together. Once we give up on the quest for 
outcome consistency, the task is to ensure that all the individual 
features that matter morally are included, and that those that 
are discriminatory, irrelevant or non- applicable in context are 
not. Put another way, the guidance should capture all and only 
the ethically relevant features that go into the decision. Striking 
a reasonable balance here between specifying broad values or 
considerations, and determining specific criteria, is a challenge.
How generic or patient specific then should the criteria be? 
The Belgian Society of Intensive Care recommended that elderly 
residents in retirement homes should not normally be admitted 
to intensive care because it would be ‘disproportionate’.32 This 
seems a very broad criterion. Many dependent residents retain 
significant independence and require limited care. It might be 
criticised for failing to consider the circumstances of individ-
uals. An analogous concern was raised in March 2020, when 
NICE recommended use of the Clinical Frailty Score (of 1–9). 
The recommendation was criticised by MENCAP and other 
non- governmental bodies for being too generic. Shortly after-
wards, NICE acknowledged it had failed to indicate that not all 
patients on the same point of the frailty scale were the same. 
For example, those with stable mental illness should not be 
considered the same as dependent adults whose conditions were 
deteriorating.33
So, should clinical triage criteria be more patient specific? The 
Pittsburgh Sequential Organ Failure Assessment scoring system 
attempts to achieve this by putting numbers against particular 
conditions (on a scale of 1–8, with the most severely ill patients 
scoring the highest number).34 The express aim is to exclude some 
patients in order to admit others and promote the survival of the 
greatest number. Those with comorbidity likely to end their lives 
within 1 year are scored more highly than those likely to live for 
a further 10 years. This scoring system is helpful as a general 
guide to distinguish classes of patients, but how far can it take us 
towards distinguishing at the level of individual patients? Bear in 
mind a number of variables, for example, patients often present 
with a mixture of comorbidities, some more severe, others less. 
Say we suffer a combination of diabetes, hypertension, obesity 
and heart disease. Comparing one patient to another on a stan-
dard scale is unlikely to capture the subtle differences of clinical 
condition between us. Second, different doctors may assess the 
prognosis and diagnosis of the same patient differently. Third, 
the availability of intensive care beds may vary from time to 
time so that even patients with identical scores may not receive 
identical care at different points in time. Finally, getting clear 
guidance from patients themselves about their own wishes may 
be extremely difficult. Thus, the unique nature of individual 
circumstances limits the reach of scoring systems in any defen-
sible procedural framework. Indeed, it is misleading to suggest 
they provide an ‘objective’ decision- making tool or algorithm at 
the level of individual patients. Uncertainty and disagreement 
between doctors are inevitable and reasonable discretion within 
the familiar Bolam35 test is always likely to play a role.i
Where is the balance between systems which are too generic 
and those so precise as to camouflage reality? There are compro-
mises to be made all along the spectrum. An alternative approach 
is not to use numbers but, instead, to place patients into broad 
categories, perhaps based around high, medium and low priority.ii 
At highest priority would be those with the highest probability of 
making a rapid recovery. Low priority is given to patients with 
the lowest probability of doing so. Priority is given to patients 
according to their capacity to recover and the speed with which 
they are likely to do so. On this view, patients are not assigned a 
‘score’—this is not an algorithm. Instead, doctors are responsible 
for applying flexible criteria within their own reasonable clinical 
discretion, together with their triage teams and coordinators, 
in the light of each patient’s individual circumstances and the 
resources available. The advantage of such a system is that it 
does not promise more ‘objectivity’ in the selection criteria than 
can be delivered; it does not promise, in advance of the actual 
context, more determination than is possible or ethically justi-
fiable. It goes without saying that proper records of every such 
decision must be maintained so that we can understand how 
and why each decision was made.36 And, of course, patients not 
admitted to intensive care still receive proper, compassionate, 
palliative care.
i Bearing in mind the ‘hard look’ scrutiny to which the test is 
now subject.42
ii This broad banding of patients has been applied in local triage 
decision- making frameworks, including the ‘Pandemic Ethics 
Framework: Treatment decisions in the setting of the COVID-19 
pandemic’ developed by the Oxford University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust (D Wilkinson, personal communication, 
2020), and also within an ethics framework for decision- making 
during the COVID-19 pandemic developed by the Royal College 
of Paediatrics and Child Health.43
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Opinions will differ as to which model is most helpful. On 
the one hand, too much flexibility may compromise the possi-
bility of invoking a consistent process; and on the other, highly 
detailed scoring systems may disguise the reality of the need to 
make judgements in context which interweave ethical value and 
clinical experience. Whichever is preferred, it must be based on 
candour and trust between clinicians and their patients and this 
merits further discussion.
CONCLUSIONS
The pandemic has given rise to much discomfort about the kinds 
of decisions that clinicians and front- line healthcare workers 
would be required to make in allocating limited healthcare 
resources. These decisions have forced us to confront rationing 
of interventions on a scale never before required. In addition to 
being deeply morally disturbing, they have given rise to specific 
legal objections. Decision- makers may have been traumatised by 
the nature of the clinical challenge and by the risk of being called 
to account in law.
We have sought to clarify for clinicians and front- line workers 
a framework which echoes in many respects the ethical frame-
works developed for CCG resource allocation decisions more 
broadly, and which, subject to certain constraints and formalised 
processes, the law has accommodated. This framework takes a 
procedural approach to these decisions, recognising their intrac-
table difficulty, the importance of context and the respect that is 
owed to individual patients and the community as a whole.
The calls for national guidance have been warranted. Such 
guidance would undoubtedly help to settle the collective nerves, 
even if it is not strictly necessary for the procedural framework 
we have articulated. But these calls have largely failed to capture 
the central issue: what the guidance should look like, and what 
consistency in decision- making demands. Our account above 
provides that content.
More broadly, outside the context of the pandemic, features 
of the current debate have revealed how, for too long, the tradi-
tions of bioethics and law have focused their attention on the 
rights and obligations of individual patients and clinicians.37 38 
This, given the history of the respective fields, is understandable, 
but times such as these illustrate the myopia of this approach. In 
bioethics, as in medical law, there have been some notable recent 
movements towards thinking about legal, ethical and policy obli-
gations at the community and social level.39–41 In the context of 
a pandemic, these kinds of public, community or wider social 
considerations are the more important. To be clear, to think in 
broader community terms is not to abandon the individual and 
their moral and legal specialness—far from it. It is simply to 
recognise that individual- specific values emerge from, and are 
embedded within, the context of the wider community in which 
all individuals are located.
Twitter Mark Sheehan @mark_sheehan_ox
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